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Introduction
The state has played a key role in the industrializa-
tion of less developed countries (Kohli, 2004), 
including the development of the automotive indus-
try (Dicken, 2011; Humphrey and Oeter, 2000). Its 
crucial importance for the automotive industry was 
most recently demonstrated in both developed and 
developing countries during the 2008–2009 eco-
nomic crisis (Klier and Rubenstein, 2010; Stanford, 
2010; Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck, 2009; Van 
Biesebroeck and Sturgeon, 2010). Along with 
investment strategies of global automotive lead 
firms, state policies have played an important role in 
the rapid development of the automotive industry in 
less developed ‘emerging’ economies since the early 
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1990s (Carrillo et al., 2004; Humphrey et al., 2000; 
Humphrey and Oeter, 2000; Sturgeon et al., 2008). 
The fastest growth took place in countries with rap-
idly growing new demand and potentially very large 
domestic markets, such as China, India and Brazil 
(Liu and Dicken, 2006; Liu and Yeung, 2008; Van 
Biesebroeck and Sturgeon, 2010), and in ‘integrated 
peripheral markets’ – that is, less developed coun-
tries located in peripheral areas surrounding tradi-
tional core regions of automotive production, such 
as Mexico and East-Central Europe (ECE) (Layan, 
2000; Pavlínek, 2002; Sturgeon et al., 2010). 
Integrated peripheral markets have been typified by 
‘hands off’ industrial policies, dependence on for-
eign direct investment (FDI) and by integration into 
core-based production networks (Humphrey and 
Oeter, 2000). Core-based lead firms invested heavily 
in these peripheral regions in assembly operations 
because of low production costs and geographic 
proximity to large affluent core markets and also 
because of their inclusion in large regional economic 
blocs, such as the European Union (EU) and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement. While the 
role of lead firms in these processes has been empha-
sized and analyzed, much less attention has been 
given to the role of state strategies beyond the provi-
sion of investment incentives, although exceptions 
exist (e.g. Drahokoupil, 2008, 2009a; Humphrey and 
Oeter, 2000; Liu and Dicken, 2006; Liu and Yeung, 
2008).
The aim of this article is to analyze the role of the 
state in the development of the automotive industry 
in Slovakia, which represents an excellent example 
of a peripheral country that has been integrated into 
European automotive production networks since the 
early 1990s. Driven by FDI inflows of €2.4bn in the 
automotive industry between 1990 and 2012 NBS, 
2013), the annual assembly of passenger cars 
increased from less than 3000 units in 1993 to 
980,000 units in 2013 (Figure 1). Slovakia became 
the 19th largest producer of automobiles in the world 
in 2012 and the largest producer of passenger cars per 
capita (181 units per 1000 people in 2012) ( SARIO, 
2013). FDI-driven export-oriented expansion of the 
automotive industry contributed to rapid economic 
growth, especially between 2000 and 2007 (OECD, 
2012). Slovakia recorded the fastest GDP growth per 
capita among the OECD members during 2001–2011 
and it significantly narrowed the income gap relative 
to the more developed half of the OECD countries 
from more than 60% to almost 40% (Figure 2).
In this article, I seek to move beyond the uncritical 
praise by the state, media, supranational organizations 
and consulting firms of FDI-driven development of 
the Slovak automotive industry (e.g. Ernst & Young, 
2010; Jakubiak et al., 2008; SARIO, 2013) and 
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Figure 1. Passenger car production in Slovakia, 1990-2013.
Source: Based on data from (OICA, 2014) and (ZAP, 2000).
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provide a more critical reading of the role of the state 
in these processes. I show that the state’s role was 
instrumental in the growth of the Slovak automotive 
industry. Although its post-1990 development has 
been driven by FDI, I argue that the state played an 
important role in making it possible by creating highly 
favorable conditions for foreign capital in Slovakia. In 
the process, the dependence of Slovakia on the exter-
nally controlled automotive industry has increased 
sharply. By 2004, foreign capital controlled 97.3% of 
the automotive industry, measured by a percentage of 
turnover (Vliegenthart, 2010). As of 2012, 80% of 
automotive suppliers were foreign-owned and 93.5% 
of technologies were imported (Luptáčik et al., 2013; 
ZAP, 2013). In 2012, the automotive industry 
accounted for 26% of Slovak exports and 20% of its 
imports (ZAP, 2013).
Theoretically and conceptually, this article draws 
upon analyses of ECE in international political econ-
omy (e.g. Drahokoupil, 2009a; Shields, 2008), stud-
ies of external dependency and truncation in 
economic geography (e.g. Britton, 1980; Dicken, 
1976), and on global value chains (GVC) and global 
production networks (GPN) perspectives (e.g. 
Gereffi et al., 2005; Henderson et al., 2002). 
Empirically, in addition to secondary sources, the 
article uses data from a 2010 survey of 299 Slovak-
based automotive firms with 20 or more employees 
which yielded a response rate of 44%, and from 38 
on-site interviews conducted with Slovak-based 
automotive firms between 2011 and 2013, plus from 
a 2005 interview at Volkswagen (VW) Slovakia.
The article begins with a discussion of the state 
and the development of the automotive industry 
in ECE. The changing role of the state in the auto-
motive industry during the post-1993 independ-
ence period is then analyzed, followed by case 
studies of the role of the state in attracting and 
accommodating three foreign assembly firms: 
VW, PSA Peugeot-Citroën (PSA) and Kia. Based 
on firm-level interviews, an evaluation of state 
policies towards the automotive industry by for-
eign and domestic firms is then presented. The 
limits of the state–foreign capital nexus for suc-
cessful economic development in Slovakia are 
considered; and, finally, the main results are 
summarized.
The state and the development of 
the automotive industry in East-
Central Europe
Since the early-1990s, neoliberal export-oriented 
strategies of economic development have become 
the new orthodoxy in less developed economies, 
including the former state socialist countries of ECE 
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Figure 2. GDP per capita in USD in purchasing power parity in OECD countries and Slovakia, 1995-2011.
Source: Based on data from (OECD, 2012).
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(Bohle, 2006; Gereffi, 2013; Gowan, 1995; Harvey, 
2005). The automotive industry is a prime example 
of the implementation of such strategies that are 
based upon attracting large inflows of FDI to finance 
and restructure existing industries, build new indus-
trial capacity and promote domestic automotive pro-
duction. Despite questions about the appropriateness 
of automotive industry-centered strategies in con-
temporary economic development (Humphrey, 
2000), countries around the world continue to lure 
automotive transnational corporations (TNCs) to set 
up new production within their territories (Liu and 
Dicken, 2006). In this intensifying competition, ECE 
countries have capitalized on the needs of core-based 
TNCs to expand geographically into ECE markets 
and increase their global competitiveness by offshor-
ing labor-intensive production to lower-cost periph-
eral locations. In addition to its market potential and 
low production costs, ECE is attractive because of its 
proximity to affluent Western European markets, its 
inclusion in the EU, flexible labor policies, low labor 
militancy, and weak labor unions. In other words, 
ECE has become one of the latest ‘spatial fixes’ 
sought by TNCs for the absorption of surplus capital 
(Harvey, 2006, 2010).
The state has played an important role in making 
this spatial fix possible during ECE’s transition from 
‘state socialism to neoliberalism’ (Shields, 2008: 
447). In the absence of sufficient domestic capital 
and after the failure of national-oriented strategies of 
the early 1990s (Drahokoupil, 2008), neoliberal 
strategies of industrial development have prevailed 
in ECE. Restructuring of the state through the pro-
cesses of transnationalization (Shields, 2004, 2008; 
Vliegenthart, 2009) opened up national economies 
for penetration by foreign capital. Some of the 
domestic political elites, variously labeled as ‘com-
prador administration’ (Baran, 1957), ‘comprador 
fraction of the bourgeoisie’ (Poulantzas, 1973), 
‘comprador intelligentsia’ (Eyal et al., 1997), ‘com-
prador class’ (Vliegenthart, 2010) or ‘comprador 
service sector’ (Drahokoupil, 2009b), aligned their 
interests with those of foreign capital and gained 
political influence, which they used to promote suc-
cessfull FDI-friendly policies across ECE. In other 
words, they ‘helped to translate the structural power 
of transnational capital into tactical forms of power 
that enabled agential power to work in sync with the 
interests of the multinationals’ (Drahokoupil, 2009a: 
3). By the late 1990s, ECE states had become com-
petition states (Cerny, 1997), which are typified by 
state strategies that rely on foreign capital as a pri-
mary vehicle for increasing national economic 
competitiveness and by adopting FDI-driven 
industrialization and restructuring strategies 
(Drahokoupil, 2008, 2009a, 2009b). ECE competi-
tion states have competed for mobile FDI by creat-
ing favorable conditions for the entry and operation 
of TNCs in their national economies, including 
offering various investment incentives, tax provi-
sions, education policies, and industrial relations. 
These competition states are typified by ‘inward 
investment regimes’ (Phelps and Wood, 2006) or 
‘investment promotion machines’ (Drahokoupil, 
2008) that are subnational territorial coalitions which 
ad hoc mobilize social actors at local, regional and 
national scales, with the aim of attracting selected 
foreign investors and promoting their interests in a 
particular locality, region and country (see also 
Phelps, 2000, 2008). Thus, FDI and industrial poli-
cies in ECE have been driven primarily by the 
imperative to accommodate the needs of foreign 
capital and, in particular, the needs of large ‘strate-
gic’ (or flagship) investors, whose interests are rep-
resented by the comprador sector in domestic 
politics. The goal of these policies has been to 
improve or maintain a country’s competitive posi-
tion in transnational flows of FDI, important not 
only for attracting new investments but also for sta-
bilizing existing ones. Although individual countries 
might be attempting actively to shape their industrial 
structure by attracting FDI into particular sectors of 
the economy, they will only succeed if these sectors 
are attractive to foreign TNCs and in line with their 
transnational investment strategies.
The bargaining powers of states have declined, 
especially in less developed countries, because of the 
liberalization of FDI policies and certain controls over 
their national economies being relinquished to supra-
national organizations (Phelps, 2008; Phelps and 
Raines, 2003). The bargaining powers of ECE states 
with vis a vis foreign TNCs with regard to FDI terms 
have been further undermined by their small domes-
tic markets and intense competition from neighboring 
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countries with similar factor endowments (see Liu 
and Dicken, 2006). Automotive TNCs exploited this 
relative weakness of ECE countries by engaging in 
regulatory arbitrage, playing countries off against one 
another with the aim of securing the best possible 
terms for their investment (Kolesár, 2006, 2007). 
Consequently, automotive TNCs were able to ‘secure 
exceptionally favorable terms of entry into the region’ 
(Bartlett and Seleny, 1998: 320). Regulatory arbitrage 
may lie behind the reduced economic benefits of FDI 
for host economies because it can lead to ‘corporate 
capture’ of national and local institutions and 
resources, in which the state and regional govern-
ments act in the context of an asymmetrical power 
relationship with respect to foreign capital and, conse-
quently, end up serving the interests and needs of for-
eign TNCs at the expense of domestic firms and 
populations (Phelps, 2000, 2008). In this situation, the 
state provides resources to reduce the investment 
costs of incoming flagship investors and tailors invest-
ment incentives to investors’ specific needs. Typically, 
the state agrees to finance and build customized infra-
structure, such as highway links, railway terminals or 
supplier parks; secures customized assembly and pro-
vision of land for greenfield production complexes; 
and finances workforce training. Additional signs of 
corporate capture include: state agencies, regional and 
local politicians placing the interests of flagship inves-
tors above those of domestic firms and local residents; 
flagship investors exerting disproportionate influence 
over state economic, education and training policy-
making, to serve investors’ specific needs; the state 
agreeing not to allow other investors to locate in the 
proximity of a flagship investor, in order to reduce 
competition for labor in the local labor market; and 
few positive regional development effects of FDI, 
beyond that of newly created jobs (Phelps, 2000, 
2008). In the words of the UNCTAD (1998: 103): 
‘When governments compete to attract FDI, there will 
be a tendency to overbid… The effects can be both 
distorting and inequitable since the costs are ulti-
mately borne by the public and hence represent trans-
fers from the local community to the ultimate owners 
of the foreign investment’.
At the same time, however, the EU local content 
regulations, combined with co-location imperatives 
of assembly plants and suppliers in contemporary 
modular assembly processes (Sturgeon and Lester, 
2004), forced automotive lead firms to develop sup-
plier networks in ECE. Lead firms put pressure on 
established foreign suppliers to follow them into 
ECE and also forced the most capable domestic sup-
pliers to upgrade in order either to meet the lead 
firms’ quality and timing requirements or be 
excluded from supplier networks (e.g. Pavlínek, 
2003; Pavlínek et al., 2009). Territorial embedded-
ness of foreign investors in host economies through 
the development of supplier networks generates 
potentially significant economic benefits, by (i) 
increasing the value from production in host econo-
mies and (ii) by generating spillovers that might 
increase the competitiveness of domestic firms 
(Pavlínek and Žížalová, 2014). For example, 
Slovakia attracted 121 investments in new automo-
tive supplier plants between 1997 and 2009 and 
Central and Eastern Europe as a whole attracted 
1,258 (Ernst & Young, 2010).1 These potentially 
large economic benefits of territorial embeddedness 
make foreign-owned automotive assembly plants 
extremely desirable in the eyes of national govern-
ments and increase their willingness to engage in 
competitive bidding with other countries in order to 
attract them.
However, the state-based competition over FDI in 
ECE has been mostly of the ‘low-road’ variety ‘on 
the basis of low wages, docile labour and low taxes, 
which perpetuate an inability to upgrade to an eco-
nomic base of higher skill and higher wages’ 
(Malecki, 2004: 1104). In 1997, Ellingstad (1997) 
warned that a ‘maquiladora syndrome’ might be 
developing in ECE. According to Ellingstad (1997), 
the maquiladora economy is typified by export-ori-
ented manufacturing, low wages that do not match 
increases in productivity, and by worker productivity 
and skills that are lower than in the home countries 
of foreign investors. Export-oriented foreign-owned 
factories often assemble high-tech, high quality 
goods with a relatively high value-added from com-
ponents that are either imported or produced locally 
by other foreign firms. Export-oriented manufactur-
ing is usually highly regionally concentrated and it 
thus contributes to large regional development dis-
parities in maquiladora economies. Overall, the 
maquiladora strategy promotes the development of 
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‘low-wage, low or medium-skill, low value-added 
manufacturing’ with limited chances of upgrading in 
the foreseeable future (Ellingstad, 1997: 9). Although 
Bernaciak and Šćepanović (2010: 141) argued that 
“by the late 1990s, regional industry had largely 
recovered from the “maquiladora syndrome”, a 
number of indicators suggest otherwise, including 
low real wages despite substantially increased pro-
ductivity, weak unions, high unemployment (14% in 
Slovakia in 2013), a persistent wage gap between 
ECE and Western Europe (Figure 3), imports of high 
value-added components or their production by for-
eign-owned suppliers rather than domestic firms, the 
weak development of higher value-added non-pro-
duction functions (Table 1), and the intensification 
of uneven development because of FDI (Pavlínek, 
2004).2 Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009) argued that 
FDI-driven industrial development strategies have 
increased ECE’s external dependence on foreign 
capital to such an extent that it has led to the emer-
gence of a ‘dependent market economy’ as a distinct 
variety of capitalism in ECE.
Economic geographers have analyzed the effects 
of FDI on national and regional economies since the 
1970s (e.g. Britton, 1980; Dicken, 1976; Firn, 1975; 
Hayter, 1982). The early studies concluded that in 
addition to external dependency FDI-driven indus-
trial development has long-term structural costs for 
less developed regions and countries in the form of 
truncated development. Truncated firms are defined 
as ‘subsidiaries and branch plants, which rely on their 
foreign based parent companies for various services 
and functions and whose autonomy is circumscribed 
by head-office dictates’ (Hayter, 1982: 277). Instead 
of upgrading and catching up with more developed 
economies, truncation tends to exacerbate the indus-
trial and technological underdevelopment of host 
economies by developing routine capital-intensive 
and low-skill industrial activities, while high-skill 
and control functions remain concentrated in core 
regions/countries (Britton, 1980; Hayter, 1982). 
However, with the introduction of post-Fordist pro-
duction methods since the late 1970s, there has been 
significant geographical reorganization of industrial 
activities by TNCs (Dicken, 2011), including changes 
in the relationship between TNCs and local areas 
(Dicken et al., 1994). We need, therefore, to consider 
the possibility that the conclusions of the truncation 
literature may no longer be as relevant in the early 
21st century as they were in the 1970s and 1980s.
FDI-driven dependent development often results 
in rapid industrialization and fast economic growth. 
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Certain ECE economies, such as those of Slovakia 
and Poland, have recorded some of the fastest rates 
of economic growth in Europe since 2000 (OECD, 
2013), which could be largely attributed to FDI-
driven extensive industrial development. In this 
type of economic development, ECE became spe-
cialized in labor intensive manufacturing, while 
control, R&D and other higher value-added func-
tions, such as marketing and branding, remained 
concentrated in the global economic core. None of 
the three large foreign-owned automotive assembly 
plants in Slovakia have any R&D functions and their 
other higher value-added functions are extremely 
limited. Strategic planning, marketing, investment 
decisions, supplier selection, product pricing and 
distribution, sale and after-sale services are all 
located abroad in the home countries of their foreign 
owners (2011–2013 interviews). The 2010 survey of 
299 Slovak-based automotive firms, conducted by 
the author and which yielded a response from 133 
firms, showed that a similar situation exists among 
foreign-owned component suppliers in Slovakia. 
Subsidiary functions and competencies were 
reported by 58 foreign firms. The results, which are 
summarized in Table 1, confirm that the vast major-
ity of foreign subsidiaries have limited 
non-production functions and that most strategic 
functions, such as strategic planning, investment 
decisions, product decisions, marketing and R&D 
are overwhelmingly concentrated abroad. In other 
words, the majority of foreign firms in the Slovak 
automotive industry do not engage in high value-
added activities that remain concentrated abroad 
and, as such, they fit the notion of truncated branch 
plants. The survey results thus suggest that external 
ownership makes it less likely that higher value-
added activities will be developed in Slovak-based 
foreign automotive firms, and are in line with the 
conclusions of the truncation literature on FDI effects 
in peripheral regions of developed countries (Britton, 
1980; Dicken, 1976; Firn, 1975; Hayter, 1982). 
Although high value-added functions and competen-
cies might gradually develop in some subsidiaries 
over time (Amin et al., 1994; Dicken, 2011), the evi-
dence from both Western Europe and ECE suggests 
that to date functional upgrading in foreign-owned 
branch plants has typically been very limited and 
uneven (Amin et al., 1994; Pavlínek and Ženka, 
2011; Phelps, 1993). Furthermore, truncation is also 
unfavorable for the development of a strong domes-
tic automotive sector because it ‘necessarily implies 
that foreign investment replaces or preempts 
Table 1. Selected functions conducted in foreign-owned automotive industry subsidiaries in Slovakia.
Parent company 
abroad
Slovak  
subsidiary
No  
answer
 No. % No. % No. %
Decisions about what products 
will be produced
54 93.1 3 5.2 1 1.7
Strategic planning 53 91.4 5 8.6 0 0.0
Investment decisions 50 86.2 8 13.8 0 0.0
Market research 50 86.2 8 13.8 0 0.0
Price setting for produced goods 49 84.5 9 15.5 0 0.0
Marketing of subsidiary products 48 82.8 8 13.8 2 3.4
R&D, design 46 79.3 8 13.8 4 6.9
Supplier selection 43 74.1 14 24.1 1 1.7
Sale and after-sale services 25 43.1 31 53.4 2 3.4
Product distribution 20 34.5 38 65.5 0 0.0
Organization of production 7 12.1 50 86.2 1 1.7
Accounting 7 12.1 51 87.9 0 0.0
Note: N = 58.
Source: 2010 survey conducted by the author.
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economically viable indigenous development’ 
(Hayter, 1982: 277).
In this mode of dependent development, value 
enhancement and value capture tend to be low 
(Smith et al., 2002). In the case of Slovakia, labor 
costs account for only 7% of the total cost of auto-
motive assembly (Bella, 2013) and tax holidays 
reduce further the potential for value capture. In this 
respect at least the situation in ECE is reminiscent of 
peripheral regions in developed countries that were 
analyzed and reported in the literature on truncation. 
It is not surprising that the truncation effects of FDI 
in ECE were documented in the 1990s and 2000s 
(Grabher, 1994, 1997; Pavlínek, 2004, 2012b). 
Consequently, the ‘catching-up’ process of ECE 
with the economic core and upgrading to a better 
position in the European automotive industry divi-
sion of labor are likely to be limited, despite the 
rapid FDI-driven industrialization of the 2000s.
GPN and GVC approaches in particular have 
argued that successful regional and national eco-
nomic development can be achieved through the 
active insertion of regions and countries into exter-
nally organized production networks and value 
chains (Coe et al., 2004; Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi et al., 
2005; Henderson et al., 2002). For example, it has 
been argued that automotive branch plants located in 
peripheral regions are being transformed into ‘per-
formance/networked branch plants’ that are embed-
ded in local economies, have greater operating and 
even strategic autonomy and, as such, can gradually 
upgrade their functions and position in GPNs 
(Dawley, 2011; Pike, 1998). GVC and GPN perspec-
tives have emphasized the possibilities for upgrad-
ing in peripheral regions through the coupling of 
local, regional and national assets with the strategic 
needs of TNCs (Coe et al., 2004; MacKinnon, 2012). 
The state plays an important role in building and 
maintaining regional and national assets in the form 
of particular labor skills, knowledge, regional insti-
tutions and FDI policies that attract foreign capital. 
There is evidence from East and Southeast Asia sup-
porting these arguments (Yeung, 2009, 2013). 
Nevertheless, Dicken et al. (1994: 40–41) remind us 
that ‘the prospects for greater local embeddedness of 
TNCs created by the new organizational forms 
appear to be limited to a minority of favoured 
places’. Even performance plants located in periph-
eral regions have been susceptible to closure and 
corporate rationalization (Dawley, 2007), which 
suggests the continuing validity of the truncation 
argument. In the context of the automotive industry 
generally and of the ECE automotive industry spe-
cifically, the GVC/GPN perspectives seem to be 
unduly optimistic because firm-level upgrading, 
especially among domestic firms, has mostly been 
limited to process upgrading (Pavlínek, 2012b; 
Pavlínek et al., 2009; Pavlínek and Ženka, 2011). 
Empirical evidence from ECE and other less devel-
oped countries also points to the decreasing role of 
domestic firms in automotive value chains, which 
are increasingly dominated by foreign firms (Barnes 
and Kaplinsky, 2000; Humphrey, 2000, 2003). 
Examples of successful strategic couplings in the 
ECE automotive industry are an exception rather 
than a rule (Pavlínek, 2012b), while the newly devel-
oped dependence on foreign capital and truncation 
effects are widespread (Table 1).
A review of existing research thus suggests that 
state industrialization strategies based on large 
inflows of FDI are problematic because FDI repre-
sents a double-edged sword. It can lead to rapid 
industrialization and economic growth in host econ-
omies but at the expense of truncation, foreign con-
trol and dependent development. An empirical 
analysis of the role of the state in the development of 
the Slovak automotive industry follows, which sup-
ports my argument about the crucial role of ECE 
competition states in making the FDI-driven devel-
opment of the automotive industry possible, despite 
their relatively weak bargaining position with for-
eign automotive TNCs.
The state and the automotive 
industry in Slovakia after 1990
Development of the automotive industry in Slovakia 
was limited before 1990. Final assembly was con-
centrated in Czechia, despite the construction of the 
Bratislava Automotive Works (Bratislavské auto-
mobilové závody – BAZ), which started in the early 
1970s (Pavlínek, 2008; Studeničová and Uhrík, 
2009). Throughout the early and mid-1990s, 
Slovakia was not perceived as a 
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favorable destination for foreign investors because 
of the perceived uncertainty related to the establish-
ment of the new independent country, weak invest-
ment incentives and shifting privatization and FDI 
policies mired in low transparency and corruption 
(Jakubiak et al., 2008; Javorcik and Kaminski, 
2004; Smith and Ferenčíková, 1998). During this 
period, the Slovak government pursued an inward-
oriented strategy of economic development that 
supported large domestic firms and was hostile to 
FDI (Drahokoupil, 2009a; Pavlínek and Smith, 
1998). The failure of this policy to generate sustain-
able economic growth, combined with domestic 
pressure from the emerging comprador sector and 
external pressure from the EU, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to open 
up to FDI (Medve-Bálint, 2014), paved the way for 
an alternative approach based on attracting large 
FDI inflows (Drahokoupil, 2008).3 In its various 
reports the IMF, for example, repeatedly urged the 
Slovak government to speed up privatization and 
open up to FDI in the late 1990s: ‘Accelerated pri-
vatization of telecommunications and of other com-
panies held by the State would convey an important 
message about the new government’s open attitude 
to foreign investors…’ (IMF, 1998 cited in 
Marcinčin, 2000b: 309). In its report, prepared for 
consultations with the Slovak government, the IMF 
(1999) considered macroeconomic instability, high 
rate of corporate income tax, the lack of tax incen-
tives compared to neighboring countries, and the 
government’s privatization policy that discrimi-
nated against foreign investors in favor of domestic 
managerial groups, as the principal reasons for low 
FDI in Slovakia. In 1999 the IMF stated further that:
For the revitalization of the banking and corporate 
sectors it is most important to accelerate their 
restructuring and privatization. Delayed addressing of 
these serious economic issues would undoubtedly 
threaten the economic stability of Slovakia and reduce 
its chances for an early integration into Western Europe 
(IMF, 1999; cited in Marcinčin, 2000a: 335).
A shift away from the inward-oriented develop-
ment strategies promoting national capitalism and 
the changing attitude to FDI was reflected in the 
‘Program for the Development of the Automotive 
Industry in Slovakia’ approved by the nationalist 
government in July 1998 (Vestník, 1998) just before 
the administration was replaced by a ‘reformist’ 
(neo-liberal) government in October 1998, follow-
ing the September 1998 elections. The Program 
defined the vision, strategy and goals of the develop-
ment of the automotive industry up to 2010. It set 
three basic goals: (1) securing the supply of vehicles 
necessary for the development of the Slovak econ-
omy, while achieving a positive trade balance with 
automotive products; (2) increasing automotive out-
put and restructuring related industries, especially 
the manufacturing, electronic, iron and steel, rubber 
and plastic industries; and (3) increasing the integra-
tion of Slovakia in the global economy through the 
automotive industry. Each of these basic goals had 
specific targets attached. For example, the automo-
tive industry output was supposed to grow by 20% 
annually until 2000, by 15% between 2001 and 2005 
and by 12% between 2006 and 2010. The govern-
ment required the automotive industry to create 
15,000 new jobs and invest 60–80bn Slovak crowns 
(US$1.7b–2.3b), mainly through FDI (US$1.4b–
1.8b) by 2010.4 The Program included detailed pro-
duction goals for individual producers, such as 
trebling the output of VW Slovakia by 2010 and 
attracting at least one additional passenger car 
assembly plant of a global lead firm that would 
assemble 100–150 thousand units annually in 
Slovakia. There were also annual production goals 
for the assembly of trucks (2,000–3,000 units), buses 
(500–800 units), light commercial vehicles (2,000 
units) and the components industry, the output of 
which was to quadruple by 2010. Domestic techno-
logical investment was intended to account for 15–
20% of the total technological investment in the 
automotive industry, with the rest to be secured 
through FDI. Slovakia was to start exporting auto-
motive technologies mainly to other ECE countries 
as well as developing and starting export business 
services for the automotive industry (Vestník, 1998).
Although the Program relied mainly on foreign 
capital for its financing, it called for state financial 
support of the automotive industry exports, employ-
ment, restructuring and regional development. It 
stressed the importance of state incentives for for-
eign investors, including lower taxes and the removal 
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of trade barriers. It also declared state support for 
automotive R&D in Slovakia, labor force training 
and educational programs to train the labor force for 
the automotive industry, active seeking and attract-
ing foreign investors, and the development of infra-
structure and integrated information systems 
(Vestník, 1998). The Slovak Ministry of Economy 
became responsible for the entire Program, which 
was coordinated by the government’s plenipotenti-
ary for the development of the automotive industry 
and further advised by the Council for the 
Development of the Slovak Automotive Industry. 
During its annual evaluation of the Program, the 
Slovak government specified tasks to be completed 
by individual ministries in a given time period in 
support of the Program. In other words, the state put 
in place a battery of policies designed to develop the 
automotive industry through FDI by global assem-
blers and component suppliers.
The goals set in the Program for the development 
of the automotive industry could only be achieved 
through large inflows of FDI, which required a radi-
cal opening of the domestic economy to foreign 
capital. In 1999, the government approved a 
‘Strategy of the support of FDI entry’ (Medžová, 
1999), which was a reaction to and emulation of the 
generous system of investment incentives introduced 
in Czechia in 1998 (Drahokoupil, 2009a). Investors 
investing at least €5m (€2.5m in regions with high 
unemployment rates) in setting up new manufactur-
ing operations in Slovakia with at least 75% of for-
eign ownership were offered five years of tax 
holidays. They were required to export at least 60% 
of their output and could qualify for 50% lower taxes 
on their profits for an additional 5 years provided 
they invested an additional €5m (€2.5m in regions 
with high unemployment rates) (Medžová, 1999). 
The corporate tax rate was reduced from 40% to 
29% and in 2003 the government introduced a 19% 
flat-rate tax and an employer-friendly, flexible labor 
code (Bohle and Greskovits, 2006; Duman and 
Kureková, 2012; Fisher et al., 2007). This radical 
shift in the treatment of foreign TNCs by the state 
was strongly influenced by the lobbying efforts of 
various organizations on behalf of foreign capital 
included in the comprador sector, such as the 
American Chamber of Commerce in Slovakia, by 
bilateral negotiations with foreign TNCs, and by the 
introduction of a ‘race to the bottom’ in tax regimes, 
labor protection and investment incentives for for-
eign capital in ECE (Bohle, 2006).
Although the Program seemed to be very ambi-
tious when it was introduced in 1998, many of its 
goals – such as the employment, investment and 
total output targets of passenger cars – were achieved 
much quicker than the government had anticipated. 
This was the outcome of the extensive growth of the 
automotive industry after 2000 that was driven by 
large inflows of FDI that were strongly supported by 
investment incentives (Figure 1). At the same time, 
state support for the development of the indigenous 
automotive industry was virtually non-existent. 
While the pre-1998 state support targeted large 
domestic enterprises in basic industries, such as pet-
rochemicals, chemicals, metals and the energy sec-
tor, and ignored the needs of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) (Beblavý, 2000), the post-1998 
governments also failed to introduce any policy sup-
porting the development of domestic SMEs (Duman 
and Kureková, 2012).
In order to illustrate further the role of the state in 
the development of the Slovak automotive industry, 
the next section provides short case studies of the 
role of the state in attracting three passenger car 
assembly plants to Slovakia after 1990: Volkswagen 
(VW), PSA and Kia.
The competition state and 
flagship investments by foreign 
assemblers
VW Slovakia
Throughout the 1990s the development of the Slovak 
automotive industry was closely linked to VW invest-
ment at BAZ. In 1991, VW proposed to assemble 
30,000 automobiles annually at BAZ, produce gear-
boxes and reorganize the automotive supplier network 
in Slovakia. The joint venture (JV) agreement was 
signed in May 1991 and VW became the sole owner 
of VW Bratislava in 1994, renamed as VW Slovakia 
in 1999 (Studeničová and Uhrík, 2009; interview at 
VW Slovakia, 14 June 2011). One of the most impor-
tant reasons why VW bought BAZ was the potential 
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to increase its cost competitiveness by developing 
low-cost export-oriented production in Slovakia 
based on large labor cost differences between 
Germany and Slovakia (Pavlínek and Smith, 1998). 
In the early and mid-1990s, Slovak labor costs were at 
less than 10% of German labor costs. In 2011, the 
average hourly compensation costs in the automotive 
industry were still 79.4% lower in Slovakia than in 
Germany (USBLS, 2013) (Figure 3). Despite the 
claims that ‘the advantage of cheap labor no longer 
exists in the automotive industry’ (Bella, 2013), wage 
differences between the core and periphery are the 
‘key to North-to-South offshoring’ (Baldwin, 2013: 
31) and automotive firms try to minimize increases in 
wages and keep them as low as possible (Freyssenet 
and Lung, 2000). VW Slovakia is no exception and 
low wages continue to be extremely important with 
regard to its competitiveness.
However, despite low production costs, the out-
put of VW Slovakia increased slowly to 41,000 cars 
in 1997. VW demanded lower taxes as a precondi-
tion for increased production (Studeničová and 
Uhrík, 2009). After taxes were reduced in the middle 
of 1998, VW relocated the assembly of the Golf 
Synchro from Germany to Slovakia. As the most 
sophisticated Golf model, the Synchro required a 
higher level of labor input than more standardized 
Golf models and therefore benefited from the low 
labor costs in Slovakia. The output of VW Slovakia 
tripled in 1998 compared to the level in 1997. The 
successful assembly of the Synchro led to further 
production increases and by 2003 VW was assem-
bling 281,000 passenger cars in Slovakia (interview 
at VW Slovakia, 14 June 2011). The state strongly 
supported this growth by approving investment 
incentives for VW and by subsidizing the location 
of foreign suppliers in Slovakia, in particular 
through the construction of supplier parks (Table 2). 
In 1997, VW had only four direct and nine indirect 
suppliers located in Slovakia (Javorcik and 
Kaminski, 2004) and the vast majority of compo-
nents were supplied from abroad (Pavlínek and 
Smith, 1998). By 2004, 17 VW principal suppliers 
were located in two newly built supplier parks 
(interview at VW Slovakia, 21 July 2005). In 2009 
the state subsidized the expansion of production, 
Table 2. Investment incentives provided by Slovakia for flagship investments by VW, PSA and Kia.
VW Slovakia PSA Slovakia Kia Slovakia
80% of BAZ sold to VW for 
US$29m in 1991
Tax allowance granted in 1998 
(€31.2m in 1999)
Subsidies for the construction of 
the components factory in the city 
of Martin (€9.6m 1998–2000)
Construction of one thousand new 
apartments in the Bratislava region 
for VW workers
Increase in the capacity of the 
Devínska Nová Ves railway station
Highway connection to VW 
Bratislava (€330m)
Provision of land and infrastructure 
for the construction of two 
supplier parks (Lozorno and 
Küster)
Investment incentives to expand 
production (€14.3m in 2009 and 
long-term tax holidays)
Land for the factory site and its 
infrastructure (€152m)
Tax holidays
€1,640 subsidy for each newly 
created job
€11.3m for worker training
Help with the recruitment of 
workers
Help with the construction of 
housing for workers
Establishment of a French 
school in Trnava
Education geared towards the 
needs of PSA at the Trnava 
technical school
Direct state incentives (€328m)
Highway construction to Žilina 
(€700m)
€1,750 subsidy for each created job
State-funded worker training
Construction of a new railway terminal
Reconstruction of the airport at Dolný 
Hričov
English language school for children of 
South Korean employees
A new health center, training center 
and police station in Žilina
1,000–1,200 new apartments in Žilina
Luxury houses close to Bratislava for 
South Korean managers
The Construction Law amended
The same incentives given to Hyundai 
Mobis
No other assembler allowed to locate 
within 100 km from the Kia factory
Sources: Zamkovský (1999), Vagac (2000), VW (2013), PSA (2003) and Kia (2004).
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which increased the production capacity to 400,000 
units and added 1,500 jobs. With strong support 
from the state, VW Slovakia thus successfully devel-
oped as a low-cost assembler within the VW corpo-
rate production network.
State policies towards VW Slovakia contributed 
to the development of the competition state. By the 
early 2000s, Slovakia was able to compete with 
other ECE countries in attracting large FDI projects, 
as demonstrated by the decisions of PSA and Kia to 
build their assembly plants in Slovakia. Both invest-
ments illustrate the active role of the Slovak state in 
the development of the automotive industry and its 
willingness to engage aggressively in the ‘race to the 
bottom’ with its Central European neighbors over 
flagship automotive investment projects.
PSA Peugeot-Citroën Slovakia
The November 2002 announcement by PSA that it 
would build a €700m assembly plant in ECE, mainly 
because of 75% lower labor costs compared to France 
(Schönwiesner, 2002), started a bidding war among 
Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Eventually, 
Hungary and Poland lost because of high labor costs 
compared with Slovakia and also because of the poor 
quality of the infrastructure at the proposed site at 
Radomsko in Poland (Trend, 2003). Czechia was dis-
qualified because PSA was already building a JV fac-
tory with Toyota (TPCA) at Kolín and also because 
of the poor quality of infrastructure and unresolved 
previous environmental liabilities at the proposed 
factory site close to the city of Žatec (iDNES, 2003). 
PSA chose the Slovak offer and its proposed Trnava 
site. The total value of investment incentives was 
limited by EU regulations to 15% of the original 
investment. Slovakia offered €152m in the form of 
the land for the factory site and its infrastructure, tax 
holidays, a €1,640 subsidy for each newly created job 
and €11.3m for worker training. The state also prom-
ised to help with worker recruitment, education 
geared towards the needs of PSA at the Trnava tech-
nical school, the construction of housing for workers 
and the establishment of a French school in Trnava 
(PSA, 2003). The combination of investment incen-
tives, low labor costs and high unemployment rate in 
the Trnava region (around 13%) were the most 
important factors favoring Slovakia, in addition to 
Trnava’s automotive tradition, well developed infra-
structure and its proximity to the capital Bratislava 
(Table 2). At the time of negotiations, the government 
did ‘the maximum to accommodate the wishes and 
needs of PSA’ (interview at PSA Slovakia, 17 June 
2011).
Kia Slovakia
The Slovak competition state was the most aggres-
sive in attracting an investment by Kia of US$1.5bn. 
In November 2002 Hyundai top management began 
to negotiate with politicians of Czechia, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia but kept them guessing about 
its selection process. In August 2003 it was reported 
that the decision about the factory location would be 
made, the choice being either Hungary or Czechia, 
with Czechia being the frontrunner (Kremský, 
2003). At that point, the Slovak minister of Economy 
traveled to South Korea to present in person a new 
package of investment incentives to the management 
of Kia, ‘an offer which was impossible to refuse’ 
according to a highly ranked former official at the 
Slovak Ministry of Economy (Kolesár, 2007: 59). 
Kia obviously used the late Slovak offer to attempt 
to obtain bigger incentives from Hungary and 
Czechia. Both countries complained that the size of 
incentives sought by Kia violated EU and national 
regulations and exceeded the expected benefits of 
the investment (Kolesár, 2007; Pavlínek, 2008). This 
suggests that Slovakia was overbidding and ended 
up paying too much for the investment.5 Kia eventu-
ally selected Slovakia on 2 March 2004. The size of 
the investment incentives was the decisive factor, in 
combination with low labor costs and low labor mili-
tancy (Table 2). Slovakia simply provided every-
thing Kia asked for (Kolesár, 2006, 2007), including 
promises that the state would not change laws for the 
duration of the investment in such a way ‘that would 
endanger economic benefits of the state support for 
Kia’, would not change its tariff policy and defend 
the investment incentives for Kia with the European 
Commission and defend Kia’s interests in any poten-
tial dispute (Kia, 2004). At the same time, Kia was to 
receive all of the incentives, even if it did not com-
plete all of the investments listed in the contract, and 
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Slovakia had no right to demand any additional 
investment or return of any investment incentives 
(Kia, 2004). The contract was thus extremely one-
sided, suggesting a very asymmetrical power rela-
tionship between Kia and the state, and it represents 
an example of corporate capture (Phelps, 2000, 
2008).
In 2005, Slovakia won another regulatory arbi-
trage over the €500m investment by South Korean 
Hankook Tire by offering €105m or 21% of the total 
value of the investment. In this case, however, the 
government did not approve the investment agree-
ment after strong criticism from Slovak entrepre-
neurs and politicians that the country would be 
paying too much (€90,000) for each newly created 
job. Slovakia then offered lower incentives (€25,000 
per job or 6% of the total value of the investment), 
which Hankook refused and, instead, built the fac-
tory in Hungary, which offered €56m in direct incen-
tives (12% of the value of the investment) (Kolesár, 
2006). The case of Hankook Tire suggests three 
important conclusions. First, investment incentives 
do matter, despite the fact that TNCs and competi-
tion states tend to downplay their importance, com-
pared to other factors, in location decisions. The size 
of investment incentives was obviously the most 
important factor in the final choice made by Hankook 
Tire between Slovakia and Hungary. Second, the 
Slovak competition state had reached its limit with 
the Kia investment and the state recognized that 
attracting FDI at any cost might be counterproduc-
tive. Third, states can ultimately limit the power of 
TNCs and the comprador sector on their territories 
but often at the expense of foreign capital exit.
Beyond assemblers: state 
policies from the perspective of 
component suppliers
As can be seen, VW, PSA and Kia benefitted signifi-
cantly from investment incentives and therefore it is 
not surprising that they evaluated the state automo-
tive industry policy positively during 2011–2013 
interviews. In addition to investment incentives, 
they stressed the importance of the flat tax and the 
adoption of the Euro. The assembly companies, 
together with the OECD (2012), would like to see 
the creation of ‘as flexible labor markets as possible’ 
and the restructuring of the education system so that 
it would reflect better the ‘market demand for labor’ 
(interviews at VW Slovakia, Kia Slovakia and PSA 
Slovakia on 14, 16 and 20 June 2011). However, it 
has been argued that the state offered large invest-
ment incentives to foreign TNCs at the expense of 
tax payers and SMEs (Bohle and Greskovits, 2006; 
Zamkovský, 2001). Indeed, after 1998, when 
Slovakia began to vigorously compete for automo-
tive FDI, the state withdrew from the welfare system 
and from supporting domestic firms (Duman and 
Kureková, 2012), spending on education in Slovakia 
has been one of the lowest among the OECD coun-
tries (OECD, 2013), and state support for domestic 
research has been erratic.6
Therefore, this article looks next beyond large 
TNC assembly companies in order to gain a broader 
perspective on how the Slovak-based automotive 
firms evaluate state policies concerning the auto-
motive industry. It draws on 38 on-site interviews 
with automotive firms conducted in Slovakia 
between 2011 and 2013 with 15 domestic-owned 
(henceforth domestic) firms and 23 foreign-owned 
(henceforth foreign) firms, including VW, PSA and 
Kia (Figure 4). The firms interviewed comprise a 
representative sample selected from the database of 
299 Slovak-based automotive firms in terms of 
size, ownership and position in the supplier hierar-
chy. The interviews were conducted with directors 
or top managers and included various questions 
about the operation and development of automotive 
firms in Slovakia. Foreign firms were asked 
whether the state economic and industrial policies 
helped them develop, or at least maintain, the stra-
tegic asset which led them to invest in Slovakia. 
Domestic firms were asked a similar question: 
whether the state economic and industrial policies 
helped them improve or at least maintain their com-
petitive advantages. The results are summarized in 
Table 3.
Of the 33 answers, eight respondents (24%) evalu-
ated the state policy towards the automotive industry 
positively, 20 (61%) negatively, and five evaluations 
(15%) were neutral, highlighting both positive and 
negative perceptions of the state policy. Of the 12 
domestic firms who replied to the question, three 
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(25%) viewed the effects of state economic policies 
positively and nine (75%) negatively. Among foreign 
firms, five of 21 responses (24%) were positive, 11 
(52%) were negative and five (24%) were neutral. A 
less critical view of state policies by foreign com-
pared to domestic firms could be attributed to the fact 
that many foreign firms strongly benefited from 
investment incentives, which some firms appreci-
ated, while criticizing other aspects of state policies. 
In many cases, however, foreign firms failed to men-
tion incentives and emphasized negative aspects of 
state policies.
Table 3 highlights the positive and negative views 
on state economic and industrial policies expressed 
by those interviewed in addition to different views 
expressed by foreign and domestic firms. Automotive 
firms were concerned most about the quality of the 
Slovak labor force and the failure of the state to edu-
cate the workforce adequately in order to satisfy the 
needs of automotive firms. The weak education sys-
tem was highlighted by 43% of foreign firms and 
19% of domestic firms, suggesting that the quality of 
the workforce was a bigger problem for foreign than 
for domestic firms. Domestic firms might be better 
accustomed to the existing quality of the local labor 
force and, therefore, do not perceive it to be a major 
problem. Respondents complained about difficulties 
encountered in finding skilled workers on the labor 
market and the lack of practical skills possessed by 
graduates from state schools at all levels. Quotes 
from four different interviews highlight the prob-
lems felt by foreign firms:
We need a high share of skilled workers for our 
operations, and I am not talking about operators, but 
technicians and engineers. Here, I need more brains, 
more people thinking how they can better perform, 
improve processes and machines. And I am struggling 
with that. And that are the two factors my parent 
company needs to be successful in Slovakia. Definitely 
it would be preferable to get it locally, to start with the 
base where people are trained, where they have the 
automotive industry spirit. But this is not the case 
(interview with CEO of foreign firm, 23 June 2011).
The problem is the support from the government. It is 
very formal and difficult to follow. The government is 
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not providing the conditions we need. We have 
problems to find enough employees, the unemployment 
rate is very low, especially in this area, in Bratislava 
and it is the same for Košice. More importantly, in my 
opinion, the labor force training is not good in Slovakia, 
the training after school, so that they [young workers] 
would have the training in factories and not [just] the 
theoretical training. I would pay for that. And that is 
missing here (interview with CEO of foreign firm, 22 
June 2011).
A long-term problem of the Slovak education system is 
that it does not reflect labor market demand. What is 
missing here are technically-oriented workers with 
university degrees, and, of course, workers with the 
vocational and high school technical training. The 
existing demand is not absolutely covered… Certainly, 
we feel that the education system is not adequately 
supported by the government (interview at a vehicle 
assembly firm, 22 June 2011).
The government should be really investing in the 
qualification of students, qualification of workers, or it 
will be a mess. The problem is really, what is the 
benefit of purchasing from Slovak companies today? I 
can buy cheap products somewhere else but I can’t find 
good products here (interview with CEO of foreign 
firm, 23 June 2011).
Increasing labor shortages in the rapidly growing 
automotive industry forced the government to 
restructure the state run system of vocational train-
ing and initiate changes in the structure of educa-
tional programs in state universities in the mid-2000s. 
The government argued that universities ‘must per-
manently adjust their curricula to the needs of the 
automotive industry and closely cooperate with the 
industry’ (SEM, 2005). This quotation implies cor-
porate capture in the area of education and training 
policy-making, but no positive outcomes of these 
state efforts were acknowledged by automotive 
firms during the 2011–2013 interviews. Thus, 
despite corporate capture, the Slovak state has so far 
been unable to satisfy the needs of foreign TNCs in 
the area of educational policy and labor force train-
ing that are essential for their continuing success in 
Slovakia and for the potential upgrading of the 
Slovak automotive industry.
The second most cited criticism of state policies 
in Slovakia was the perceived inflexible labor law, 
Table 3. Evaluation of state economic and industrial policy by automotive firms in Slovakia, 2011-2013.
Total answers % Foreign % Domestic %
Negative
 Weak educational system 12 32.4 9 42.9 3 18.8
 Inflexible labor laws 4 10.8 3 14.3 2 12.5
  Investment incentives for large 
foreign investors
3 8.1 1 4.8 2 12.5
 High taxes 3 8.1 1 4.8 2 12.5
 Bureaucracy 2 5.4 1 4.8 1 6.3
 No help to small firms 1 2.7 1 4.8 0 0.0
 Euro 1 2.7 0 0.0 1 6.3
 Corruption 1 2.7 0 0.0 1 6.3
Positive
 Investment incentives to large TNCs 5 13.5 5 23.8 0 0.0
  State subsidies for specific projects 
of domestic firms
4 10.8 0 0.0 4 25.0
 Euro 2 5.4 2 9.5 0 0.0
 Stable country 1 2.7 1 4.8 0 0.0
 Highway construction 1 2.7 0 0.0 1 6.3
No opinion/no influence/no answer 6 16.2 2 9.5 4 25.0
Notes: Number of firms included: 38. Each firm could list more than one answer.
Source: 2011–2013 interviews.
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especially in terms of hiring and firing workers 
according to the momentary needs of firms, and the 
inability of firms to use short-term employment con-
tracts. Additional negative views included the sup-
port for foreign investors at the expense of domestic 
firms, the strong Euro, which was undermining the 
competitiveness of domestic products in foreign 
markets, high and rising taxes, and corruption. 
Among the positive aspects of state economic and 
industrial policies, foreign firms appreciated invest-
ment incentives most, while several domestic firms 
highlighted the importance of state subsidies for 
their specific projects. Two respondents emphasized 
the importance of the Euro for their firms (Table 3).
Limits of the state-foreign capital 
nexus
The long-term goal of the state is to improve 
Slovakia’s position in automotive GPNs through 
industrial upgrading. It should be achieved through 
the development of automotive R&D (SEM, 2005), 
which seems to be a typical approach towards the 
automotive industry in less developed economies. 
As Humphrey and Oeter (2000: 55) argued ‘govern-
ments expect to generate investment and employ-
ment in labour-intensive activities in the short term, 
and hope that eventually higher-skilled jobs will also 
be created’.
Firm-level interviews confirmed that Slovakia is 
attractive for the FDI-driven development of R&D 
activities because of its low R&D labor costs (2011–
2013 interviews). However, the limited supply of an 
R&D labor force is viewed as a major constraint. A 
director of the foreign-owned supplier of plastic 
parts in Slovakia argued during an interview on 23 
June 2011, ‘we [foreign investors] are all struggling 
with [low] technical competencies and knowledge of 
university graduates’. More importantly, given the 
overwhelming dependence of the Slovak automotive 
industry on foreign capital, the state effort to develop 
strategic automotive R&D in Slovakia is likely to 
succeed only if it is in line with the strategic need of 
automotive TNCs. To date, automotive lead firms 
have engaged in very limited internationalization of 
their R&D into ECE (Pavlínek, 2012b). Given these 
constraints, the development of larger-scale and 
strategic automotive R&D, beyond more routine 
R&D, is likely to be difficult to achieve in Slovakia. 
Industry-financed expenditures on R&D decreased 
in Slovakia from 0.65% of GDP in 1995 to 0.2% of 
GDP in 2010 (OECD, 2013) and Slovakia fell fur-
ther behind many advanced and emerging countries 
because its industrial R&D investment did not keep 
up with the extensive growth of automotive produc-
tion during the 2000s.
The dependence of the development of the auto-
motive industry in Slovakia on the strategic needs of 
foreign TNCs is obvious from the fact that the annual 
production targets specified by the government in 
1998 (Vestník, 1998) for the assembly of trucks, 
buses and light commercial vehicles have not been 
achieved. This illustrates that the state policy has 
only been successful to the extent that it has met the 
strategic needs and goals of large automotive TNCs. 
High volume production of passenger cars and labor 
intensive assembly of special models in particular 
could benefit from the combination of a cheap labor 
force and investment incentives to develop low-cost 
production in integrated peripheral markets. To date, 
automotive TNCs have not shown any interest in the 
assembly of trucks, buses and light commercial 
vehicles in Slovakia.
Superficially, state policies for the development of 
the automotive industry in Slovakia appear to be 
extremely successful. FDI in the automotive industry 
has contributed strongly to capital formation, exports, 
the balance of payments and employment. For exam-
ple, in 2012 the narrowly defined automotive indus-
try (NACE 29) directly employed 60,828 workers 
(compared to 6,000 in 1993) and it generated an addi-
tional 140,000 jobs indirectly (Luptáčik et al., 2013). 
However, despite the FDI-driven economic growth, 
the unemployment rate has remained one of the high-
est among OECD countries, and the concentration of 
automotive FDI in western Slovakia, where 74% of 
all automotive firms are located, has contributed to 
uneven development. As of 2011, Slovakia recorded 
the highest regional inequalities at the TL2 level 
among OECD countries (OECD, 2012). It is also 
questionable to what extent large investment incen-
tives contribute to self-sustaining growth (Amin et 
al., 1994). More importantly, this growth has been 
achieved at the expense of subordinating state 
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policies and decision-making to those of foreign 
capital. Bella (2013) has argued: ‘Volkswagen and 
Kia do not care about the enforceability of law or the 
administrative maze [in Slovakia] because any gov-
ernment minister is as far away from them as the 
nearest phone and they manage to negotiate a service 
from the state they need’. State industrial policies 
have been driven by the needs of foreign capital, 
resulting in foreign-capital dependent development 
(Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009) and corporate capture 
(Phelps, 2000), in which automotive lead firms 
achieved disproportionate influence over govern-
ment decision making and its economic policies.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that Slovakia has experienced 
extremely successful growth in the automotive 
industry when measured by its rapidly increased out-
put and exports. This article has demonstrated that 
the state and its policies concerning foreign capital 
have played an important role in this growth, by 
opening the domestic economy to FDI and by com-
peting successfully for large FDI projects with gen-
erous investment incentives and low taxes. It has 
also illustrated the power of automotive lead firms to 
achieve the best possible investment terms from the 
states through regulatory arbitrage among countries 
with similar factor endowments.
The development of extensive spillovers from for-
eign to domestic firms, which would drive the 
upgrading and development of a strong domestic 
automotive sector, might justify FDI-driven industri-
alization policies and large state expenditures spent 
on attracting foreign lead firms. At present, the lack 
of available data makes it impossible to evaluate the 
extent of spillovers in the Slovak automotive industry 
but ‘the spillover effect on domestic companies in the 
[automotive] sector is likely to be very limited’ 
(Šipikal and Buček, 2013: 479). Experience from 
other integrated peripheral markets, such as Mexico, 
suggests that the development of capabilities of local 
suppliers is a long-term process that takes decades to 
come to fruition (Sturgeon et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
the current configuration of the global automotive 
industry has not been favorable with regard to the 
extensive development and upgrading of domestic 
firms beyond process upgrading (Barnes and 
Kaplinsky, 2000; Humphrey, 2000, 2003). In other 
words, a strong development of the domestic auto-
motive industry that would justify high levels of state 
expenditure on attracting foreign firms, reduce the 
dependence of the Slovak automotive industry on 
foreign capital, and stabilize the supplier network in 
Slovakia, will be difficult to achieve. The future suc-
cess of the automotive industry in integrated periph-
eral markets, such as Slovakia, will continue to 
depend on FDI and the transfer of foreign technol-
ogy. However, the wage-competitiveness of Slovakia, 
its distinct advantage in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
has been eroded as Central European currencies 
devalued during and after the 2008–2009 economic 
crisis (OECD, 2012) and Slovakia has increasingly 
been threatened by relocation of the most cost-sensi-
tive labor intensive activities to lower-cost countries 
(Pavlínek, 2012a).7
Firm-level interviews suggested that long-term 
state investment in higher education and vocational 
training is important for maintaining and improving 
the competitiveness of Slovak-based automotive 
firms and it is crucial for the development of higher 
value-added functions in both foreign subsidiaries and 
domestic firms. Because local value creation is based 
on high knowledge activities stemming from both 
domestic and foreign firms, the development of these 
competencies would help Slovakia upgrade its posi-
tion in automotive GPNs from being a predominantly 
automotive industry subcontractor based on cheap 
labor to a knowledge-based automotive producer with 
innovative globally-oriented foreign and domestic 
firms. As can be seen, however, while the state has 
been willing to offer generous incentives to foreign 
firms to invest in Slovakia, its investment in voca-
tional training and higher education has been inade-
quate to meet the labor needs of automotive firms. 
The state support of R&D and of the development of 
innovative domestic firms has also been inadequate. 
To date, the state has mainly pursued quick, FDI-
based policy solutions rather than a long-term policy 
focusing on the development of strategic assets that 
could attract FDI in higher value-added functions.
External control and dependence on foreign capital 
and technology represent the greatest weaknesses of 
the FDI-driven industrialization. Overwhelming 
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foreign ownership means that ultimate decisions 
about the industry are made abroad by TNC head-
quarters in the context of their global operations. 
Sturgeon et al. (2010: 232) have recently argued with 
respect to Mexico: ‘Clearly, the fate of an [automo-
tive] industry in a small, regionally embedded country 
like Mexico is tied to factors that lie largely outside 
the control of the state or of local firms’. To a large 
extent state industrial policies in Slovakia have been 
subordinated to the needs of foreign capital, leading to 
corporate capture, which may limit the abilities of the 
state to pursue independent industrial development 
policies. Large investment incentives and low corpo-
rate taxes undermined the ability of the state to finance 
adequately domestic research, education and the sup-
port of domestic firms. Ultimately, therefore, the rapid 
development of the automotive industry in Slovakia, 
ECE as a whole, as well as other integrated peripheral 
markets, is to be attributed to a successful spatial fix 
by global automotive lead firms. The rapidly increased 
automotive output and exports tell us more about the 
successful offshoring of automotive technologies and 
production models by German, French, South Korean 
and other foreign firms to Slovakia than they do about 
the capabilities of the domestic automotive industry 
(Baldwin, 2011). Based on the experience of other 
peripheral regions, it is unlikely that foreign lead 
firms will develop higher value-added functions to a 
significant extent in Slovakia. In the long term, it is 
likely that value transfer in the form of profit repatria-
tion by foreign firms will exceed the value of invested 
foreign capital, and the profit-seeking behavior of for-
eign firms will not necessarily be aligned with long-
term state development goals. For example, because 
foreign automotive firms have been most interested in 
low-cost production in Slovakia, they will be inter-
ested in maintaining the wage gap between Slovakia 
and Western Europe; while the state should strive to 
close this gap in order to increase the standard of liv-
ing of its population. In such a situation, it will be dif-
ficult for Slovakia and other ECE countries to improve 
substantially their peripheral position with regard to 
the division of labour in the European and global 
automotive industry and join the core areas of the 
automotive industry in order to benefit fully from the 
rapid FDI-driven development that has taken place 
since the early 1990s.
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Notes
1. In addition to ECE, Central and Eastern Europe 
includes the European countries of the former Soviet 
Union (the Baltic States, Belarus, Moldova, Russia 
and Ukraine).
2. The average monthly wage in the Slovak automotive 
industry was €992 in 2012 (Luptáčik et al., 2013). A 
CEO of a foreign firm that has produced in Slovakia 
since 1993 remarked: ‘We are here just because of 
[low] wages’ (interview on 14 June 2011). According 
to OECD (2013: 27), ‘the domestic value added con-
tent of Slovak exports is very low by international 
comparison’.
3. Slovakia signed the European Association Agreement 
in October 1993 (effective on February 1, 1995), 
applied for EU membership on 27 June 1995, became 
an EU member on May 1, 2004, and adopted the Euro 
currency on 1 January 2009.
4. All conversions of the Slovak koruna used in this arti-
cle are based upon official exchange rates for a par-
ticular year published by the Slovak National Bank 
at http://www.nbs.sk/en/statistics/exchange-rates/
en-kurzovy-listok.
5. Slovakia paid US$86,000 per job created by Kia, 
compared to US$50,000 per job created by PSA 
Slovakia, US$48,000 by Hyundai in Czechia and 
US$37,000 by TPCA in Czechia (Kolesár, 2007).
6. The Slovak Science Foundation (Agentúra na pod-
poru vedy a výskumu) had to cancel general calls for 
proposals in 2003, 2008, 2009 and 2013 because the 
national government did not allocate any money for 
basic research in the national budget. In 2011, financ-
ing of successful projects was cut by more than 50% 
(Hajduch, 2014).
7. By 2012, Slovak hourly compensation costs in man-
ufacturing (US$11.30) exceeded those of Poland 
 by guest on December 10, 2014eur.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Pavlínek 19
(US$8.25) and Hungary (US$8.95) and were closing 
in on those of Czechia (US$11.95) (USBLS, 2013).
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